We spent the first part of class going over the first conflation/paradox argument set. The first conflation argument is §22 (although it follows directly from the variations of language-game §2 that we find in §§19-21, and so it can be seen as a sophisticated version of the conflation that is first found in the Builders Game) and the first paradox argument is at §95 (The Paradox of Thought). In the second half of the class we then finished up the sections on reading in order to set up the second argument set (the second conflation is at §193 and the paradox is at §201), and we here moved quickly over some key points in the mid-§§170s and the §§180s. We’ll spend our next class (on Tue Nov 16) going over the second set (and thus our reading is §§183-243), which will bring us up to the brink of the third paradox argument (although its accompanying conflation argument is back at §48).
Our primary aim in the first half of class was to understand the nature of both the conflations and paradoxes with which Wittgenstein deals. His ‘conflation arguments’ and ‘paradox arguments’ are arguments against a specific misconception (which we can also call a preconceived idea, a bewitching picture, or an erroneous assumption) that causes philosophical problems and yet leads to a philosophical theory. In the conflation argument, he argues against the misconception by showing that it results from a conflation (whether it’s a matter of conflating part with whole or means of representation with what is represented; as Williams puts it, it is a matter of conflating “normative and nonnormative features” (15)). Wittgenstein is aware that the conflation argument is unlikely to work on its own to change the thought of his interlocutor, insofar as the person bewitched by a certain philosophical picture will be highly tolerant of contradiction and paradox: the bewitched person is led not to give up their conflation or to see it but rather to “refine his [or her] theorizing” (Williams 15). Thus, after tracing out the way in which the conflation leads one to be tolerant in this fashion (this is the process of cognitive therapy), Wittgenstein finally brings us around to the central paradox that the interlocutor tolerates and that causes him/her so much trouble. This paradox arises from a truism that, however, is in direct contradiction with a truth generated by the conflation. Ideally, one would at this point realize that the proper response to the paradox is to give up the pseudo-truth stemming from the conflation. Depending on how one looks at things, Wittgenstein then moves on to a new target or to the same target in a different arena of philosophical concern (as if his opponent does not really admit defeat but retreats to a different area of philosophy).
We sought to develop our sense of the conflation and paradox arguments by looking at the first set, and I wanted us to be especially on guard for the way in which language (surface grammar) itself plays a role in generating the conflation and consequent paradox (a conflation and paradox that can be ‘healed’ by attending to depth grammar, or grammar in the philosophical sense of the term). In the first argument set, we are dealing with semantic norms – norms that govern our sense of the language-reality relationship. We will move from a misunderstanding of those norms to the Paradox of Thought. In the process, we see the shift from Referentialism to Mentalism, insofar as we move from the idea that an object constitutes the meaning of a word to the idea that the meaning of what we say is a matter of something in the mind, whether we characterize that something in terms of what the mind does (mental acts or processes) or things in the mind (on the one hand, we have mental states or habits or dispositions, if we focus of the quality of the mind; on the other hand, if we focus on the ‘things’ in it, we have grammar, rules, and formulas, all of which are kinds of norms that govern our use of language). Thus, we move from the idea that meaning is a matter of reference (of objects in the world) to the idea that meaning is a matter of the mental (of something in the mind). Indeed, the second conflation/paradox set stems from a misunderstanding of norms, insofar as we are tempted to think that our ability (and desire and intention) to follow a norm is enabled by an act of interpretation (such that I am able to follow a norm only if I interpret it correctly). This will, as we’ll see next week, lead to problems (and we set this conflation and paradox up very quickly at the end of class; the conflation is set up in §§193-94 and the paradox in §§201-02).
But back to the argument over semantic norms and the first set of arguments: We actually saw the move from referentialism and objects to mentalism and something in the mind in the Tractatus, insofar as the Tractarian thinker moves from objects to sense in showing (and, really, explaining) how meaning works. This was because of the Puzzle of False Propositions that a strong referentialist faces. Strong referentialism would endorse the claim that both words and sentences mean via reference: objects are the meanings of words and existing facts are the meaning of sentences. This is a problem insofar as we clearly do talk meaningfully about things that do not exist. With respect to words, we can avoid this problem by restricting what can be named to simples. Thus, most physical objects, which can be destroyed, are actually complex (and so are facts, not objects); most words, insofar as they appear to name objects that are not actually objects (because they can be destroyed), are not actually logical names but are instead disguised propositions. However, even if we restrict the possible meaning of a word/name to simple objects, we still have the problem of sentences, which can refer to nonexisting facts and make sense (whether the sentence is true but the fact no longer exists or whether the sentence is simply false).
The solution the Puzzle of False Propositions – and so the solution to the question/problem of the distinction between true and false statements – is the idea of sense: what we say has sense insofar as it pictures a possible state of affairs. However, there is a possible problem here, insofar as the meaning (not the reference but the significance, or Bedeutung) of what we say is now tied not to something out in the world but rather to a sense in the mind. What I say or write – the perceivable sounds or signs that I utter or mark – has meaning not insofar as it refers to a fact but only insofar as it expresses a sense, and that sense is not in the world but in the mind of the one who expresses it. This sense, then, does the valuable work of meaning, and I can mean something (i.e., my sentence can convey something) insofar as I mean something (i.e., insofar as I intend to convey that sense). Now, the truth or falsity of my sentence – which was originally the puzzling thing – becomes irrelevant; all sentences have, in the language of the TLP, “equal value,” and whether they are true or false is, from the viewpoint of philosophy, not of interest (and is of interest only to natural scientists). In terms of what makes the sentence meaningful, then, its actual truth or falsity is meaningless (although it must potentially be the one or the other, but which it is no longer matters). Thus, the Picture Theory of Sense does not explain the puzzling nature of truth and falsity but rather makes the actual truth or falsity nonexistent from the perspective of the proposition: the proposition (to anthropomorphize for a moment) does not care and cannot know whether it is actually true or false.
More to come …
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